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Summary 
 
We use a dynamic specification to estimate the impact of trade on within-country income inequality in a 
sample of 65 developing countries (DCs) over the 1980-1999 period. Our results suggest that trade with high 
income countries worsen income distribution in DCs, both through imports and exports. These findings 
provide support to the hypothesis that technological differentials and the skill biased nature of new 
technologies may be important factors in shaping the distributive effects of trade. Moreover, we observe that 
the previous results only hold for middle income countries (MICs); we interpret this evidence by considering 
the greater potential for technological upgrading in MICs.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the ‟80s, several developing countries (DCs) have opened their economies 
towards international markets. Although the actual patterns of this process have differed across 
regions and have been determined by different reasons1, on the whole trade flows have significantly 
increased over the last three decades and the diffusion of technology between countries has become 
more rapid and widespread.  
Whether such a process of globalization is associated with narrowing or widening income 
disparities within developing countries (within country income inequality, WCII) is a matter of 
controversy in the economic literature.  The standard trade theory, expressed in the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, predicts that DCs should experience egalitarian trends as a consequence of trade. One of the 
most important corollaries of Heckscher-Ohlin‟s model (HO) is the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) 
theorem. According to this main building-block of the theory of international trade, openness will 
benefit a country‟s relatively abundant factor, since trade specialization will favor sectors intensive in 
the abundant factor. Taking into account that most DCs – when compared with the world economy 
– are relatively abundant in unskilled labor and so have a comparative advantage in this production 
factor, international trade should increase the demand for the unskilled workers and their wages, so 
ending up with an overall decrease in wage dispersion and in WCII. 
However,  if the basic dichotomic framework depicted by the HOSS framework is extended to 
account for multiple skill-related categories of workers (Wood, 1994), country groups (Davis, 1996)  
and traded goods (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996), the main distributive prediction of the HOSS theory 
is theoretically undetermined and depends on the relative weights and directions of trade flows. 
Moreover, if the HOSS assumption of homogeneous production functions2 among countries is 
relaxed, then international openness may facilitate technology diffusion from High Income Countries 
to Low and Middle Income (LICs and MICs) ones, and it is very likely that the new technologies are 
more skill intensive in relation to those in use domestically before trade liberalization.  If such is the 
case, then trade – via technology – should imply a counter-effect to the HOSS theorem prediction, 
namely an increase in the demand for skilled labor, an increase in wage dispersion and so an increase 
in income inequality (see Lee and Vivarelli, 2004 and 2006b).  
This paper contributes to this literature by presenting new empirical results based on a unique 
dataset including 65 developing countries over the 1980-1999 period. Indeed, the first novelty of this 
paper is the use of a global inequality dataset – the UTIP-UNIDO database – which has been made 
available very recently and which ensures data comparability both through time and across countries 
(see section 4). 
The second novelty of this paper regards the econometric specification and the estimation 
technique. Given the revealed persistence of the within-country inequality indexes, we use a dynamic 
specification which allows us to account for the path-dependent nature of the distributional pattern. 
The resulting endogeneity problem is addressed by using a Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected 
(LSDVC) estimator, a recently-proposed panel data technique particularly suitable for small samples. 
As regards to our dependent variables, we use trade measures3 - namely import and export – 
further disentangled accordingly to their origin/destination areas. Our results show that both imports 
and exports from/to industrialized countries (ICs) significantly worsen income distribution in MICs. 
We interpret these findings by considering the interactions between a country‟s economic integration 
and its technological upgrading.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we critically discuss the 
arguments in favor of the alleged egalitarian impact of trade on within-country income inequality, 
mainly from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 presents the empirical model and explains the 
econometric specification. Section 4 describes the data and shows some descriptive statistics. Section 
5 presents and discusses the results, while conclusive statements are derived in section 6.  
2. THE LITERATURE  
The standard model used by economists to analyze the effect of trade on the relative returns to 
different factors of production is the HO model.  In its simplest version, as reported in Wood 
(1994), the model assumes  two factors of production – skilled and unskilled labor - and two 
countries, the North and the South, each producing two goods (skilled and unskilled labor-
intensive)4. The related predictions in terms of the distributive consequences of international trade 
are well known: greater openness should increase the relative demand and prices for unskilled labor 
and lead to a more equal distribution of wages in low-skilled-labor abundant countries.  However, 
the HO model and the SS theorem are based on several assumptions that are too restrictive to 
describe the real world5. In the next paragraphs, we discuss the implications arising if some 
assumptions of the model are relaxed. 
 
2.1: Global or local validity of the SS theorem? 
Even retaining the central assumptions of the HO model, what matters for the distributive 
consequences of trade liberalization is the relative position of a given country amongst the other 
countries within its own „cone of diversification’ (Davis, 1996).  In fact, a developing country may be 
considered as “unskilled abundant” in global terms, but this may not be true in relation to other 
DCs. If factor abundance is defined in a local sense, the distributional consequences of trade can be 
the exact opposite of what we expect in a traditional HOSS framework (Davis, 1996).  This argument 
is particularly important for middle-income countries (MIC) which are likely to be relatively 
unskilled-labor-abundant in comparison with high-income trading partners and relatively skilled-
labor-abundant in comparison with low-income ones6.  
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) push this argument a step further and propose a model where 
there is a continuum of goods ordered along a ladder whose steps are characterized by different 
levels of skill intensity. Trade liberalization would shift the production of intermediate inputs 
(through trade and foreign direct investment) form developed to developing countries. While such 
products would be characterized as unskilled-labor-intensive from a developed country‟s perspective, 
they appear to be skilled-labor-intensive from a developing country‟s point of view. In this way, 
average skill intensity and therefore the demand for skilled labor increase both in the North and in 
the South, inducing a rise in the skill premium in both areas. Zhu and Trefler (2005) have extended 
Feenstra and Hanson‟s model to a case without foreign direct investment but with a Ricardian source 
of comparative advantage added to that based on factor endowment. In their model, technological 
catch-up by the developing country causes a shift in production of the least skill-intensive Northern 
goods to Southern countries where they become the most skill-intensive goods produced,  thus 
leading to a rise in the demand for skilled labor in both developed and developing countries. Xu 
(2003) has also developed a model with a continuum of goods where the boundary between traded and 
non-traded goods is endogenous and determined by trade policy. He shows that trade liberalisation 
by expanding a developing country‟s export set can raise wage inequality. 
 
2.2: The role of technology 
If the hypothesis of identical technologies among countries is dropped and one assumes that 
developed countries and DCs differ in their technology levels7 and that globalization facilitates 
technology diffusion from North to South, then the final impact of trade in terms of demand for 
labor also depends on the skill intensity of the transferred technology relative to that currently in use. 
There are many empirical studies showing the skill-biased nature of technological change in the 
developed economies (see, for instance, Berman et al. 1994; Autor et al. 1998; Machin and Van 
Reenen, 1998). Without necessarily assuming that developed countries transfer their “best” 
technologies to the DCs, it is quite reasonable to expect that transferred technologies are relatively 
skill-intensive, i.e. more skill-intensive than those in use domestically before trade liberalization. In 
more detail, trade can imply a substantial technological up-grading in the opening developing 
countries through different channels (see also next sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). On the one hand, a 
developing country can implement embodied technological change through the importation of 
“mature” machineries (including second-hand capital goods, see Barba Navaretti, Solaga and Takacs, 
1998) from more industrialized countries. On the other hand, a lagged DC can enjoy the “last 
comer” benefit of jumping directly on a relatively new technology (see Perkins and Neumayer, 
2005)8. By the same token, technological catch-up may be induced by exporting to richer countries 
both through substituting/replacing out-dated technologies in the exporting sectors and through the 
development of entirely new businesses characterized by process and product innovation addressed 
to satisfy a more sophisticated demand coming from the industrialized countries. Indeed, to the 
extent that technology upgrading is linked to trade, globalization may increase the demand for skilled 
labor in DCs, reversing the prediction of the SS theorem9. 
 
2.2.1: The import channel 
Trade liberalization favors technological upgrading by increasing international flows of capital 
goods (Acemoglu, 2003). There is much literature that finds that import flows can in fact contribute 
to the international transfer of technology by providing DCs‟ local firms access to new embodied 
technologies and by creating opportunities for reverse engineering.   
Coe and Helpman (1995), studying a sample of OECD countries, find that foreign knowledge 
embodied in traded goods10 has a statistically significant positive impact on aggregate total factor 
productivity (TFP) in importing countries.  Coe et al. (1997) have extended the analysis to DCs and 
show that imports of intermediate goods raise the TFP in DCs as well. Moreover, Mayer (2000) 
restricts the definition of import shares by considering only machinery and finds that in this case the 
impact of foreign R&D is much greater. Schiff and Wang (2006) underline how trade-related 
technology diffusion can occur through an increase in a country‟s level of exposure to that 
technology through trade (quantity), or through an increase in the knowledge content of that trade 
(quality). The distinction between the quality and quantity of new technologies is further analyzed by 
Barba-Navaretti and Solaga (2002), who look at the role of imported machinery in transferring 
embodied technological progress11. Other studies used firm level database to examine imports as a 
mechanism for technological transfer and find that imports can in fact improve firm technological 
capabilities (see for example, Blalock and Veloso, 2007).    
Robbins (1996, 2003) calls the effect of in-flowing technology resulting from trade liberalization 
the „skill-enhancing trade (SET) hypothesis‟. His idea is that trade accelerates the flows of physical 
capital (and embodied technology) to the South, inducing rapid adaptation to the modern skill-
intensive technologies currently used in the North. The resulting increased demand for skilled labor 
may then lead to a widening of wage and income dispersion in DCs.  
 
2.2.2: The export channel 
Breaking into foreign markets allows firms located in the DCs to acquire knowledge of 
international best practice.  
On the one hand, foreign buyers often provide their suppliers with technical assistance and 
product design in order to improve the quality of imported goods, and they may transmit to their 
suppliers located in DCs the tacit knowledge acquired from other suppliers located in  advanced 
countries (Epifani, 2003). For instance, Yeaple (2005) shows that increased export opportunities 
make the adoption of new technologies profitable for more firms, thus increasing the aggregate 
demand for skilled labor and the skill premium. Bustos (2005) builds a model upon the works of 
Yeaple (2005) while Melitz (2003) argues that trade liberalization reduces variable export costs and 
makes adoption of new technologies profitable for more firms; in turn, adoption of skill-intensive 
new technologies increases the relative demand for skilled labor and the skill premium12.  
On the other hand, Verhoogen (2007) argues that trade leads to an upgrading of average product 
quality in exporting plants, which in turn generates demand for a better qualified workforce. He finds 
that the “quality-upgrading hypothesis” is relevant as an explanation for increasing wage inequality in 
Mexico. This idea is also pursued by Fajnzylber and Fernandes (2004), who point out that exporters 
may be pressured by their foreign clients to produce according to quality standards that are higher 
than those prevailing in the domestic market. In fact, they find that exports had a positive impact in 
the relative demand for skills in Brazil.  Other evidence for the inequality-enhancing role of exports 
can be found in Hanson and Harrison (1999), who document that exporting firms employ a higher 
share of white-collar workers than non-exporting plants in Mexico13.    
 
2.3: Other, non technological, drivers through which trade can affect inequality. 
The scope of this paper and the focus of the empirical tests put forward in the next sections are 
limited to the short-term impacts of trade on within-country income inequality in DCs. However, it 
is worthwhile discussing briefly in this sub-section other drivers  which can affect inequality in the 
medium-long term.  For instance, openness to international markets may induce a change in the 
relative factor endowments14 and sectoral specialization of a given DC and so generate distributional 
consequences (see Gourdon and Maystre, 2006). This is true both in terms of competition with the 
industrialized countries and in terms of competition intra-DCs (see Alarcón and McKinley, 1998). 
Just to provide an example, consider the likely impact of a persistent world price shock (say oil) on 
the factor endowments and relative incomes in a developing country specialized in the export of the 
involved primary commodity (see Birdsall and Hamoudi, 2002)15.  By the same token, trade may 
affect income distribution in benefiting the owners of factors of production other than skilled and 
unskilled labor. For example, exports concentrated in agricultural commodities may greatly benefit 
land owners and – in the likely case land ownership is highly concentrated – contribute to income 
polarization in a developing country specialized in primary agricultural commodities (see Cornia, 
2004). A similar argument can be applied to other natural resources such as the mining sectors (see 
Leamer et al., 1999)16.  Finally, asymmetric trade agreements and asymmetric trade liberalization (see, 
for instance, the persistent protectionism in the OECD countries as far as some basic commodities 
are concerned) may obviously have important consequences in terms of global inequality (see 
Slaughter, 2000; Oxfam, 2002). 
Although the factors briefly discussed above are important, they will not be investigated in this 
study. Indeed, this contribution will make use of annual data on WCII in several DCs over the 
(relatively short) period 1980-1999 (see section 4). In contrast, the phenomena discussed in this 
subsection affect both the within-country and the between-country dimensions of inequality and they 
mainly operate in the long term since they involve factor endowments, the ownership and sectoral 
structure and other institutional circumstances.  
From an empirical point of view, they can be satisfactorily investigated through the comparison 
of cross-section analyses over a relatively long time span17. In contrast, the empirical approach 
adopted in this study (longitudinal panel based on annual data) can effectively capture the mid/short-
term effects (such as the skill enhancing trade) of globalization, while between country structural 
differences can be considered quasi-fixed. In particular, the latter are wiped out as fixed effects while 
long-term persistent trends are controlled for both through the adopted dynamic specification and 
the inclusion of some controlling variables (see next section 3 for more details18) 
 
2.4: Previous empirical evidence 
On the whole, relaxing the HO hypothesis of technological homogeneity and allowing for capital 
deepening and skill-biased technological change (SBTC) opens the way to important possible 
counter-effects in terms of the distributional impact of international trade. The hypothesis of the 
diffusion of SBTC in the DCs has recently been confirmed empirically by Berman and Machin (2000 
and 2004), who found strong evidence for an increased demand for skills - at least for manufacturing 
sectors of middle-income DCs in the „80s - and related it to skill-biased technology absorption19.  
Conte and Vivarelli (2007) have studied the impact of technological transfer on the employment 
of skilled and unskilled labor in a sample of low and middle income countries.  By using a direct 
measure of embodied technological transfer - namely the trade flows from industrialized countries of 
those goods which reasonably incorporate technological upgrading - they have found that imported 
skill-biased technological change was in fact one of the determinants of the increase in the relative 
demand for skilled workers within DCs in the '80s.  
These works suggest a role for technology in explaining the increased demand for skilled labor in 
DCs. However, they do not deal directly with income distribution. The empirical literature explicitly 
treating the impact of international trade on WCII is heterogeneous and fails to reach a consensus. 
On the one hand, an increasing number of country-specific empirical works show that the 
intensification of trade flows is frequently associated with an increase in the relative demand for 
skilled labor and a consequent rise in the skill premium20.  On the other hand, the evidence arising 
from multi-country empirical works is mixed and the conclusions often depend on the specification 
adopted and the measurement of the variables of interest21.  
However, few empirical studies unambiguously support the predictions of the SS theorem and 
document a decrease in income inequality after trade liberalization. These include Wood (1994), 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990), Calderón and Chong (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2004). The 
majority of cross-country studies, instead, either do not register any significant and systematic 
relationship between tarde and income distribution (see e.g.  Edwards, 1997; Li, Squire and Zou, 
1998 and Vivarelli, 2004), or clearly contradict the distributive outcomes of traditional trade theory. 
For instance, Barro (2000), Ravallion (2001), Cornia and Kiiski (2001), Lundberg and Squire (2003), 
Easterly (2005) and Milanovic and Squire (2005) have shown that in their samples international trade 
is associated with an increase in income inequality.  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL  
As we underlined in section 2, most previous works studying the relationship between trade and 
income distribution used cross sectional analysis. In contrast, this paper adopts a dynamic 
specification which takes countries‟ unobserved heterogeneity fully into account.  
 
3.1: The tested  specification 
The adoption of a dynamic specification is motivated by two reasons. From an econometric point 
of view, the revealed persistence of the inequality variable (ρ = 0.834)22 calls for a necessary AR(1) 
check.  From an interpretative point of view, the lagged value of the dependent variable can account 
for the path-dependent and viscous nature of inequality, which is affected by a number of structural 
factors that are very slow to change, such as institutional context, factor endowments, land and asset 
distribution, urbanization, etc. (see section 2.3). 
Therefore, the proposed empirical specification will be the following: 
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where i and t denote country and time period, respectively. EHII  is the estimated household 
income inequality (see section 4); OPEN  is the international trade variable (alternatively: total trade, 
imports and exports); KX  are a set of control variables; ty  are a set of year dummies; i  is the 
idiosyncratic individual and time-invariant country‟s fixed effect and it   the usual error term. All 
variables are expressed in natural logarithms.  
Although our dynamic specification with fixed effects permits us to ignore time invariant and 
quasi-fixed factors, we still have to include some controlling variables which may change over the 
short-term. 
First, the dynamics of within-country income inequality can be affected by per-capita GDP levels 
(GDP-PC), that is by the stage of development of a given economic system. According to Kuznets 
(1955), the relationship between inequality and economic development follows an inverted-U pattern 
with inequality rising at the initial stages of development and then falling. The basic idea under 
Kuznets‟ demand-pull model is that - during the initial stages of development - growth in demand 
spurs labor-saving technological change favoring the demand for capital and skills, so increasing 
income inequality. In other words, a certain increase in WCII is expected to be a sort of “price to 
pay” in exchange of the initial stage of economic development. Later, as catching-up proceeds, the 
labor-saving tendency attenuates and more egalitarian forces, such as an increase in education (and so 
in the supply of skilled labor), are allowed to have their impact (for recent revisitings of Kuznets‟ law, 
see Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Barro, 2000; Grimalda and Vivarelli, 2004). Since the Kuznets‟ theory 
predicts a non linear impact of per-capita GDP on WCII, both GDP-PC and GDP-PC squared have 
been included in the following regressions. 
Second, education should also be taken into account. An increase in education implies an increase 
in the supply of skilled labor, a decrease in the relative skilled/unskilled wage differential and an 
overall decrease in income inequality. In a standard demand/supply framework, a steady increase in 
the supply of skilled labor might keep the relative skilled/unskilled wages constant, even in the 
presence of a SBTC fostering an increase in the demand for skills. Therefore it is important to 
include a proxy for the educational level in the estimating equation.  Since the effect of an increased 
education can be not immediate, a one year lag regressor has also been included in the following 
regressions. 
Third, we have included the inflation rate in the model, to check for the macroeconomic 
environment which is likely to affect income distribution. This aspect is particularly important in 
developing countries, often characterized by highly instable macroeconomic conditions. Since 
inflation erodes real wages and disproportionately affects those within the bottom percentiles of 
income distribution, a number of papers found that high inflation is associated with higher inequality 
(see for example,  Lundberg and Squire, 2003 and De Melo et al., 2006).  
Finally, time trend and annual specific shocks might affect our investigated relationships; this is 
why we have included year dummies in all the tested regressions. 
 
3.2: The econometric methodology 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors in (1) implies an  obvious 
problem of endogeneity. A natural solution for first-order dynamic panel data models is to use GMM 
(General Method of Moments; see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Unfortunately, this method is only efficient asymptotically and is not suitable for small samples. In 
our case, we only have 65 countries, observed over 20 years and hence the GMM – designed for 
“small T and large N” may not be appropriate.  Therefore we use the LSDVC23 estimator, a method 
recently proposed by Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999), Bun and Kiviet (2003) and extended 
by Bruno (2005) to unbalanced panels such as the one used in this study. This method has been 
proposed precisely as a suitable dynamic panel data technique in the case of small samples where 
GMM cannot be applied efficiently24. Let us suppose we have a standard autoregressive panel data 
model, based on the possibility of collecting observations over time and across individuals; our 
problem can then be described as follows: 
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where y is the vector of observations for the dependent variable, D is the matrix of individual 
dummies, η is the vector of individual effects, W is the matrix of explanatory variables including the 
lagged dependent variable, δ is the vector of coefficients, and ν the usual error term. The Least 
Square Dummy Variable  (LSDV)  estimator is the following: 
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where A is the within transformation which wipes out the individual effects. 
 
Since the LSDV estimator is not consistent when the lagged dependent variable enters into the 
model, a more accurate measuring of its bias can be seen as the first step towards correcting it. The 
LSDV bias is given by:  
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For the analytical expression of the terms in formula (4), see Bun and Kiviet (2003, p.147). 
In their Monte Carlo simulations, Bun e Kiviet (2003) and Bruno (2005) consider three possible 
nested approximations of the LSDV bias, which in turn are extended to the first, second and third 
terms of (4)25. In this study we will correct for the most comprehensive and accurate one (B3) in their 
notation). Therefore, in the following, the LSDVC estimator is equal to:  
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The procedure has to be initialized by a consistent estimator to make the correction feasible, since 
the bias approximation depends on the unknown population parameters. Three possible options for 
this purpose are the Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators. In this study, 
we initialize the bias correction with the Arellano-Bond estimator, here considered as the best 
established panel data estimator implemented in the STATA econometric package used26. 
Finally, the estimated asymptotic standard errors may provide poor approximations in small 
samples, generating possibly unreliable t-statistics, while bootstrap methods generally provide 
approximations to the sampling distribution of statistics which are at least as accurate as 
approximations based upon first-order asymptotic assumptions. Accordingly, in this study the 
statistical significance of the LSDVC coefficients has been tested using bootstrapped standard errors 
(200 iterations). 
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The empirical analysis in this paper makes use of a time-series/cross-country dataset that provides 
comparable and consistent measurements of income inequality both across countries and through 
time. This database was created by Galbraith and associates, and is known as the University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) database27. It contains two different types of data on inequality: the UTIP-
UNIDO and the EHII indexes. The UTIP-UNIDO is a set of measures of the dispersion of 
manufacturing payments, built using the between-groups component of a Theil index measured 
across industrial categories28 (see Galbraith and Kum, 2003). The EHII is an index (ranging from 0 
to 1 as a conventional Gini index) of Estimated Household Income Inequality and is built combining the 
information in the Deninger and Squire (D&S)29 data with the information in the UTIP-UNIDO 
data.  The D&S database is the standard reference for inequality studies; however, the coverage of 
the D&S is sparse and unbalanced, and consequently its measures of inequality originate from 
different sources and refer to a variety of income and population definitions30. For instance, many 
cross-country studies on inequality have used the D&S-based World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID)31. Indeed, the Gini coefficients in WIID are based on different income definitions 
(income/expenditure; gross/net), different recipient units (individuals/households) and population 
coverage (urban/rural/all).  Even when adjustments are made to improve data comparability32, these 
differences may still result in serious data inconsistency. This poses important problems of 
comparability which may undermine the robustness of the results. Instead, the EHII – based on the 
consistent UTIP-UNIDO data – overcome such comparability problems.  
The EHII is in fact built following a two-step procedure. First, the D&S Gini coefficients are 
regressed on the UTIP-UNIDO measures of income dispersion, and on a matrix of conditioning 
variables including dummies for the three types of data source (income/expenditure; household/per 
capita; gross/net)33.  Then EHII is computed using the same exogenous variables, where the 
intercept and coefficients are the deterministic parts extracted from the first-step estimation (see 
Galbraith and Kum, 2003, for a detailed explanation of this procedure).  
The resulting EHII dataset is an unbalanced panel which contains more than 3,000 observations 
covering over 150 countries over the period 1963-1999. We restrict the sample to 65 developing 
countries over the 1980-1999 period34. The choice of the countries is guided by the availability of 
data regarding the other variables we enter in the model, while the limitation of the time span to the 
1980-99 period is due to economic and interpretative reasons: these are in fact the years when 
globalization – measured in terms of trade flows – registered a substantial increase in most DCs. 
Table A1 in the Appendix gives the complete list of countries, and reports the initial, final, and mean 
value of the EHII index in each country, as well as the change in the value of the index in the period 
considered. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the EHII index over the sample period for the two 
groups of Middle Income (MIC) and Low Income (LIC) countries35. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
We observe a rising trend in the EHII index in both the series. However, inequality is higher in 
LICs where the average EHII index was around 45 in 1980 and almost reached 50 in 1999. In MIC 
inequality levels are lower, but they experienced a significant increase, especially in the decade going 
from the mid-80s to the mid-90s.   
Data on total trade flows are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). This dataset 
provides aggregate data on imports and exports and also allows us to distinguish trade flows 
according to their origin/destination areas. In particular, we are interested in disaggregating trade 
flows with other DCs with respect to flows with Industrial Countries (IC).  
Following Wood (1994) and Wood and Ridao-Cano (1999), our measure of skill supply (human 
capital = HK) is built as the ratio between the percentage of the population with basic education and 
the percentage of the population with no education. When the number of educated people expands 
relative to the non-educated, we expect a decrease in income inequality. These data are gathered 
from the Barro-Lee database (See Barro and Lee, 1996 and 2001), which provides information on 
educational attainment over five-year intervals36. In order to match these data with our annual 
observations on inequality, we interpolated the data available, under the hypothesis that the yearly 
increase is constant over time for the missing periods.  
Other control variables, such as GDP per capita and the inflation rate37, are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) provided annually by the World Bank. In the next table summary 
statistics of the data included in the regressions are presented. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
5. RESULTS  
Table 2 displays the results for the baseline specification. Columns differ according to the 
openness variable included: trade (% GDP) in columns 1/2, imports (% GDP) and exports (% 
GDP) in columns 3/4 and 5/6 respectively. In this and the following tables, the dynamic 
specification (1) has been tested using contemporaneous trade variables only, and then their lags as 
well, in order to check for possible delayed impacts. Thus, the column with the contemporaneous 
impact is followed by a column also including the lagged impact together with the long term 
coefficient (LTI), the value and significance of which are reported in the bottom panel of the tables38. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
As can be seen from table 2, contemporaneous and lagged trade variables never turn out to be 
significant and „export‟ even exhibits the unexpected sign; apparently, globalization has no impact on 
within country income inequality in the investigated DCs. 
 Inflation and the contemporaneous supply of education have the expected signs; an increase in 
the supply of skilled labor tends to diminish inequality, while higher inflation is associated with a 
worsening of income distribution. However, only the inflation coefficient is significantly different 
from zero. Since the insignificant result concerning education may be due to the way it has been 
measured (see section 4), we put forward an alternative measure of human capital in order to account 
for the quality of education (see Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). In table A2 in the Appendix, we used 
HKPP, which takes into account only post-primary education (related to the percentage of the 
population with no education); however, no significant results emerged from this robustness check. 
The impact of GDP per capita is also not significant with regard to both its linear and squared 
coefficient. Finally, as expected, the lagged dependent variable is always higher than 0.87 and largely 
significant39 . 
These findings confirm the results of previous empirical works which failed to envisage a strong 
and significant relationship between trade and within-country income inequality. However, the 
examination of total trade flows does not enable us to identify the mechanisms of transmission 
between globalization and income distribution precisely. As we stressed in section 2, the trade-
induced transfer of technology may be an important factor affecting the distributional consequence 
of trade liberalization. When the developing countries open to trade, they become more exposed to 
technologies and innovations produced in more advanced countries. Hence, it is trade with richer 
countries which should involve technological upgrading, a general shift of labor demand towards 
more skilled workers, a consequent increase in wage differentials and so an increase in inequality. In 
other words, the insignificant results emerging from table 2 may be affected by important 
composition effects which deserve further investigation. 
Therefore we disaggregated trade flows according to their origin/destination areas, in order to test 
the possible inequality-enhancing effect of trade with richer countries, both through the import (see 
section 2.2.1) and the export channel (see section 2.2.2). Table 3 reports the results of this 
decomposition.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The estimates reveal that trade, imports and exports with industrialized countries (ICs) are the 
components of trade which worsen income distribution, whereas the same flows towards other 
developing countries tend to exert the opposite effect. More specifically, contemporaneous estimates 
reveal a positive and significant role of total trade and exports with ICs in increasing within-country 
income inequality in the investigated DCs. While still positive, imports do not reach the statistically 
significant threshold. Once one-year lags are taken into account, lagged impacts tend to prevail and 
the divide between flows with ICs and those within DCs becomes even more obvious: trade and 
imports with ICs worsen income distribution, while trade, imports and exports with other DCs have 
the opposite effect. Overall, trade flows with ICs (either contemporaneous or lagged) positively and 
significantly impact on EHII, while trade flows with other DCs exert an equalizing effect. The role 
of trade with ICs is confirmed by the positive signs of the LTI coefficients, computed only for trade 
flows with the Industrialized Countries (all of them turn out to have the expected positive sign and 
to be significant with regard to total trade and import). 
We interpret this evidence as support for the hypothesis that technological differentials between 
trading partners play an important role in explaining the distributive impact of globalization (see 
section 2).  
However, these results may be affected by another composition effect; in fact, pooling together 
MICs and LICs does not allow us to capture the distinctive features of the relationship between 
trade, technology upgrading and inequality in the two groups of countries. MICs and LICs may in 
fact be affected in different ways by international trade. Indeed, the potential for technological 
upgrading should be greater in MICs, which are more likely to be characterized by higher „absorptive 
capacity‟ (or “capabilities”), which are considered a fundamental pre-requisite for taking advantage of 
new technologies (see, for instance, Abramovitz, 1986; Lall, 2004). This may in turn influence the 
choice of the technologies to import; in other words, MICs have the necessary capabilities to use the 
technologies produced in more advanced countries and to follow a catching-up pattern of 
development. While this process may have a positive impact on economic growth, it is very likely 
that it also implies  an increase in the demand and wages for skilled labor (at least temporarily, until 
the labor supply adjusts as a result). In contrast, trade with LICs is often confined to the importation 
of older (or second–hand) capital equipment that requires fewer skills to operate than technologically 
updated equipment (Barba Navaretti et al., 199840).  Therefore, as far as LICs are concerned, trade 
with more advanced countries may not have the same adverse consequences in terms of income 
distribution.  
Turning our attention to the export aspect, MICs are better endowed with the industrial 
infrastructure needed to serve the sophisticated and demanding markets of the developed countries, 
so the skill-enhancing impact of exports is likely to affect only this group of counties. In contrast, 
exports from LICs are mainly concentrated in the primary and extractive sectors and are generally 
characterized by a low-technology content.  
By the same token, MICs are the countries which should better register the possible equalizing 
effect of trade within DCs emerging from the previous table 3; in fact, trade flows between MICs 
and the overall group of DCs (MICs+LICs) should involve technologies that are – on average – less 
advanced of those currently in use in the sub-sample of MICs. Thus, it is plausible that these trade 
flows can be considered as the opposite of the “skill enhancing trade”. 
Therefore we expect the effects of trade to be stronger for MICs. We test this idea in table 4, 
where the openness indicators of table 3 are interacted with dummy variables indicating whether a 
developing country is middle income or low income. In this way, we are able to evaluate the 
differential impacts of the disaggregated trade flows into/from the two groups of countries.     
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The results from the new final estimates support our hypothesis; we note that interestingly the 
previous empirical findings only hold for middle income countries. As can be noticed, all the results 
from table 3 are confirmed both in terms of sign and significance, but only with regard to the 
variables interacting with MICs, while interactions with LICs never turn out to be significant. 
Moreover, long term impacts (LTI) involving trade flows between ICs and MICs always emerge as 
positive (and significant in the case of trade and import) 41.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has discussed the impact of trade flows on within-country income inequality in DCs. 
We have argued that the interplays between trade and the adoption of technology may constitute an 
important mechanism leading to a possible increase in income differentials in the liberalizing DCs. 
Theoretically, if the HOSS assumption of identical technologies across countries is dropped, 
increasing exposure to international markets can foster the process of technology diffusion across 
DCs, through both imports and exports. The technologies transferred from more advanced 
countries are more skill-intensive with respect to those domestically in use in the DC and thus the 
trade-induced technology upgrading may result in a shift in labor demand in favor of skilled labor, 
ending in a generalized increase in the skill premium and hence in a more unequal income 
distribution.  
We have used a dynamic specification to estimate the impact of trade on WCII in a sample of 65 
DCs over the 1980-1999 period.  Consistently with previous evidence, our results suggest that total 
aggregate trade flows are not significantly related to WCII in DCs. However, we have moved a step 
forward, disaggregating total trade flows according to their areas of origin/destination, our 
hypothesis being that what should matter in terms of income inequality is not trade in general, but 
only trade with more advanced countries, where the potential for technology diffusion originates. 
Indeed, we found that only trade with high-income countries worsens income distribution in DCs, 
through both imports and exports. Interestingly enough - and not yet investigated by the theoretical 
literature - contrasting evidence emerges as far as intra DC trade is concerned:  import and export 
within the group of the DCs are probably unskill biased and imply a decreasing WCII.  
Having tested the differential impact of trade in middle income vs low income countries, we then 
observed that the previous results only hold for MICs. We interpreted this evidence by considering 
the greater potential for technological upgrading in MICs, in terms of both their higher “absorptive 
capacity” and their superior ability to serve the differentiated and high-quality markets of the 
developed world. 
Many of previous studies were characterized by a cross-section methodology and hence the 
between-country dimension of inequality was dominant. In contrast, this paper has focused on 
WCII, which has become even more important in recent times.  
In fact, while population-weighted between-country inequality has shown a declining historical 
trend, the opposite has emerged as far as the within-country component of income distribution is 
concerned (see Sala-i-Martin, 2002). Moreover, WCII trends are crucial in terms of social cohesion42 
and political stability and may be considered a possible target for national and multilateral economic 
policies.  
In particular, our results suggest that the optimistic HOSS predictions do not apply to the current 
wave of globalization (see Easterly, 2001 and Stiglitz, 2002); indeed, not only a decrease in within-
country inequality is not automatically assured by increasing trade, but increasing income disparities 
and marginalisation phenomena are very likely to emerge as consequences of the “skill enhancing 
trade”.   
In this framework, the domestic level of economic and human development does matter in 
shaping the direction and the impact of globalization over WCII in the DCs. For instance, the role of 
the physical and human infrastructures is crucial in minimizing the negative distributional effects of 
increasing trade with the more industrialised countries. Conversely, bottlenecks in the supply of 
educated and skilled labor may condemn a developing country to economic marginalisation and to 
high levels of domestic income inequality.  
This means that there is scope for active social intervention, such as targeted and high-quality 
education and training policies addressed to increasing the supply of skilled labor. At the same time, 
the construction of a welfare system able to create safety nets and insurance schemes for the possible 
victims of the globalization process would also be advisable. In this context, national policies within 
DCs might be severely constrained as far as domestic public budgets are concerned, while 
international organizations might instead play a pivotal role (see, for instance, ILO, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Including changes in the world demand for the different commodities, trade liberalization policies, changes in terms of 
trade, international agreements, etc. 
2 That is, the same technology and absence of scale economies.    
3 It is important to make clear that in this paper we use outcome-based trade measures, and not policy-based measures such as 
quotas, tariffs or other policy variables. Indeed, in this paper we want to investigate the distributional impact of actual 
trade flows, independently from the different circumstances – including trade liberalization policies – which may have 
facilitated the process of trade openness.  
4 Other assumptions in the model are perfectly competitive markets and identical production functions with freely 
available technology across countries. 
5 Cline (1997), for examples, argues that “from the start, the SS and the factor price equalization theorems faced the 
major problems that they seemed radically divorced from reality” [Cline, 1997; p. 43] 
6 Thus, when MICs open to trade, they have to face the competition of labor-intensive manufacturing from  low-wage, 
labor abundant low-income countries, and this can change their comparative advantages in labor-intensive exports, 
possibly resulting in a decrease in demand and wages for unskilled workers and in a wider wage gap. Cornia (2003) 
underlines the importance of this argument in explaining the increase in inequality that many middle-income countries 
experienced during the '90s. He stresses that, as a consequence of the entry into the world market of low-skill 
manufactures from China, India, Indonesia and other exporters with substantially lower wages, the formal sector of 
middle-income countries “no longer has a comparative advantage in labor-intensive exports and either it informalises its 
production via a long chain of subcontracting agreements or shifts production towards skill-intensive exports. In both 
cases, wage inequality is likely to worsen” [Cornia, 2003, p.605]. 
7 This hypothesis is now common in standard models of international trade such as those provided by Krugman (1979), 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
8 An example being the diffusion of mobile telecommunications in Sub-Saharian Africa in countries where the traditional 
telephone networks are limited to few urban areas (we thank one of the four referees for providing us with this example). 
9 Foreign direct investments are also important vehicles of international technology diffusion. However, the treatment of 
their role is beyond the scope of this work. 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 Foreign knowledge is defined as the sum of trading partners‟ R&D stocks (that is a measure of knowledge quality), 
weighted by bilateral trade shares (a measure of knowledge quantity).  
11 Their study focuses on the imports of machines from the EU to a sample of neighboring developing and transition 
countries in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Southern Mediterranean. They find that imported machinery has a 
positive impact on total factor productivity and that the impact is greater the higher the technological complexity of  the 
imported machinery (proxied by its average unit value). 
12 She uses this framework to explain the increase in wage inequality experienced by Argentina after trade liberalization.   
13 For possible recursive and cumulative relationships between technology, skills and exports, see Montobbio and Rampa 
(2005) and Alvarez (2007) 
14 Including changes in the supply of skilled labor; this is why the following econometric specification is controlled for 
the trend in the supply of educated labor (the human capital, HK variable). 
15 The extent to which factor endowments and sectoral specialisation can change – in the mid-long term – as a 
consequence of international trade depends on different circumstances, such as the degree of factors‟ mobility (see 
Aghion, Burgess, Redding, Zilibotti, 2006), technological constraints, institutional and organisational adjustment costs.  
16 For an Hecksher-Ohlin-type theoretical model also including natural resources, see Leamer, 1987. 
17 For instance this is the case of the econometric analysis put forward by Cornia and Kiiski (2001) on two cross sections 
of 35 countries for the period 1970-74 and 1990-99. 
18 We thank one of the four referees for suggesting that we make clear the limitations of our empirical approach. 
19 The authors found that skill-upgrading was predominantly a within-industry phenomenon, that it was concentrated in 
the same industries across countries, and that DCs' indicators were highly correlated with those for OECD countries. 
Their results seem to suggest that SBTC has in fact been transferred from the developed world to middle income 
countries, and support the pervasive nature of SBTC. Statistically insignificant results emerge for low-income countries. 
20 For instance, Robbins and Gindling (1999) using household survey data for Costa Rica found that wage inequality 
increased after trade liberalization. Goldberg and Pavnik (2001) and Attanasio et al. (2004) reached similar conclusions 
for Colombia, using household survey data. Arbache, Dikerson and Green (2003) showed that in Brazil the influx of new 
skill intensive technologies, boosted by trade liberalization, contributed to the rise in the university education premium. 
For Mexico, several empirical works have shown that trade liberalization goes hand-in-hand with rising wage inequality: 
using household data, Feliciano (2001) found that the increase in wage inequality was much greater in the tradable sectors 
                                                                                                                                                              
than in the non-tradable ones. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) have shown that the skill premium increased by about 68 per 
cent during the liberalization period. Using plant level data, Hanson and Harrison (1999) also found evidence for rising 
wage inequality following the reduction of trade barriers. Görg and Strobl (2001), analysing a panel of manufacturing 
firms in Ghana, also found that returns to skills increased after trade liberalization. Similar discoveries were made by 
Robbins (1996) for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines and Uruguay. Other studies 
jointly consider other determinants of inequality, together with globalization (see, for instance, Chamarbagwala, 2006, on 
the Indian case). 
21 These studies generally vary in their conclusions due to different factors. First, they cover different countries and time 
periods. Second, the very definition of globalization is ambiguous: some papers measure globalisation by looking at trade 
(and/or FDI) outcomes, while others focus on liberalization policies, such as decreasing tariffs or quotas. Third, different 
econometric specifications have been used. Most researchers estimate the relationship between inequality and 
globalization by regressing levels on levels, while others have focused on changes in both the dependent and the 
explanatory variables (for a critical discussion of the different approaches, see Lee and Vivarelli 2004 and 2006a). 
22 AR(1) has been computed using the fixed effect estimator.   
23 Least Square Dummy Variable Corrected. 
24 Monte Carlo experiments (see Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003) show that, in small 
samples, the LSDVC estimator outperforms consistent IV-GMM estimators such as the Anderson-Hsiao and Arellano-
Bond estimators. 
 
25 In particular, with an increasing level of accuracy:  111  TcB ;  11212  TNcBB ; 
 21323  TNcBB . 
26 It should be noted that the three alternative procedures are asymptotically equivalent.  
27 The data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu  
28 The original data come from UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) statistics which provide 
average manufacturing pay by industries. The comparability and accuracy of the UNIDO compilation of employees and 
payment measures have recently been endorsed by Rodrik (1999) and Berman  and Machin (2000 and 2004).  
                                                                                                                                                              
29 Deninger and Squire (1996) collected many disparate surveys of income and expenditure inequality and compiled them 
into a single panel, offering 693 country/year observations since 1947.  
30 Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) present a critique of the D&S database that focuses, in part, on the fact that many 
different types of data drawn from different sources are mixed up in the data set. In general, they criticize the use of 
“secondary” statistics and show how both cross-country comparisons and time-series analyses may crucially depend on 
the choice of data.   
31 The WIID is a comprehensive database built by the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), 
based at the United Nations University in Helsinki. It  includes Deininger and Squire‟s (1996) dataset, and it is regularly 
extended and updated. 
32 For example, Vivarelli (2004) restricts the analysis to Gini Indexes based on nationally representative surveys and uses 
dummy variables to check for the remaining differences in the type of surveys; Bensidoun et al. (2005) uses only changes 
in Gini indexes based on the same income concept and reference unit within each country.  
33 The other variables included in the regression are the ratio of manufacturing employment to population, the share of 
urban population, and population growth rate.  See Galbraith and Kum (2005), p. 126 for a theoretical justification of the 
choice of variables.  
34 We retained only those countries with at least five observations over the investigated period. 
35 We defined the income groups following the 1987 World Bank Classification which divides economies according to 
their per capita gross national income, calculated using the World Bank Atlas Method (See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:6413315
6~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html). We chose 1987, because  it is the year closest to the 
median of our data time distribution.  
36 In particular, the data used here refer to the educational attainment of the population aged 25 and over.  
37 Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator and shows the rate of price change in the 
economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency.  
38 Only the one period lag is displayed in the tables, since lags of higher orders were never significant (results available 
under request). The long term impact (LTI) was computed as the sum of the estimated coefficients of the 
contemporaneous and lagged openness variable over: 1- ρ (long-run multiplier, see Verbeek, 2004, p.311). 
                                                                                                                                                              
39 This revealed persistence in the dependent variable is a further confirmation of the need for a proper dynamic 
specification. 
40 Indeed, the authors have found that the „absorptive capacity‟ of a country (the ability to master a new technology) 
affects the choice of the type and age of the imported machineries.  
41 These findings are consistent with Berman and Machin‟s results (2000 and 2004): when studying the international 
diffusion of SBTC, these authors found evidence for SBTC being rapidly transferred from developed to middle income 
countries, while no results emerged for the low income group of countries. 
42 Wealth, income levels and status are more often and easily compared among people within the same country, rather 
than between individuals of different countries. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 1980s 1990s 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
     
Trade (% GDP) 38.48 23.33 48.58 30.94 
Exp (% GDP) 16.47 12.73 20.76 14.51 
Imp (% GDP) 22.01 13.41 27.82 18.08 
Trade with DCs (% GDP) 12.82 8.13 17.48 12.58 
Trade with ICs (% GDP) 25.66 18.54 31.10 21.86 
Exp to DCs (% GDP)  5.00 4.15 7.18 6.75 
Exp to ICs (% GDP)  11.47 10.80 13.58 10.18 
Imp from DCs (% GDP)  7.82 5.35 10.30 7.44 
Imp from ICs (% GDP)  14.19 10.07 17.53 13.09 
GDP per capita 1907.13 1809.53 2476.03 2292.66 
Inflation rate 67.43 614.55 93.58 507.36 
HK 1.55 4.38 2.16 4.46 
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Table 2: All Sample, different openness measures; dependent variable: EHII 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
EHII (-1) 0.876*** 0.884*** 0.877*** 0.884*** 0.890*** 0.888*** 
 (0.063) (0.070) (0.063) (0.071) (0.072) (0.084) 
TRADE 0.00227 -0.00636     
 (0.0095) (0.016)     
TRADE (-1)  0.00695     
  (0.017)     
IMP   0.00108 -0.00409   
   (0.0080) (0.014)   
IMP (-1)    0.00600   
    (0.014)   
EXP     -0.00223 0.00107 
     (0.0087) (0.013) 
EXP (-1)      -0.00673 
      (0.015) 
GDP  -0.0563 -0.0627 -0.0553 -0.0588 -0.0583 -0.0661 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
GDP
2
 0.00260 0.00309 0.00254 0.00279 0.00297 0.00354 
 (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0084) 
HK -0.00116 -0.00227 -0.00117 -0.00220 -0.00126 -0.00208 
 (0.0028) (0.0043) (0.0028) (0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
HK (-1) 0.000150 0.000891 0.000155 0.000838 0.000310 0.000768 
 (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
INFL 0.00637*** 0.00708*** 0.00639*** 0.00711*** 0.00631** 0.00710*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026) 
       
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
LTI  
0.005 
(0.09) 
 
0.016 
(0.08) 
 
-0.050 
(0.09) 
Observations 783 735 783 735 782 734 
Number of 
countries 
65 64 65 64 65 64 
 Note
s:  Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (bias correction initialised by Arellano-Bond estimator):  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. LTI is the Long-term Impact, standard errors in brackets.  
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Table 3: Disaggregating trade flows according to their origin/destination 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
EHII (-1) 0.849*** 0.820*** 0.873*** 0.873*** 0.858*** 0.822*** 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.063) (0.067) (0.073) (0.077) 
TRADE_DC -0.0193** -0.00221     
 (0.0082) (0.011)     
TRADE_IC 0.0182** -0.00826     
 (0.0093) (0.015)     
TRADE_DC (-1)  -0.0353***     
  (0.013)     
TRADE_IC (-1)  0.0371**     
  (0.016)     
IMP_DC   -0.00741 0.00705   
   (0.0074) (0.0092)   
IMP_IC   0.00775 -0.0119   
   (0.0086) (0.013)   
IMP_DC (-1)    -0.0278***   
    (0.010)   
IMP_IC (-1)    0.0355***   
    (0.013)   
EXP_DC     -0.0139** -0.00712 
     (0.0072) (0.0090) 
EXP_IC     0.00940* 0.00915 
     (0.0069) (0.013) 
EXP_DC (-1)      -0.0169** 
      (0.0084) 
EXP_IC (-1)      -0.00114 
      (0.014) 
GDP -0.0818 -0.121 -0.0558 -0.0672 -0.0882 -0.122 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
GDP
2
 0.00391 0.00623 0.00238 0.00282 0.00479 0.00696 
 (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0086) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0074) 
HK 0.0000481 0.00361 -0.000878 0.00117 -0.000246 0.000790 
 (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0042) 
HK (-1) -0.000264 -0.00267 0.000203 -0.000670 -0.000374 -0.00139 
 (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
INFL 0.00647*** 0.00675*** 0.00639*** 0.00686*** 0.00660*** 0.00732*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
       
Year dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
       
LTI 
 0.159** 
(0.08) 
 0.186* 
(0.13) 
 0.044 
(0.49) 
Observations 783 735 783 735 782 734 
Number of 
countries 
65 64 65 64 65 64 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (bias correction initialised by Arellano-Bond estimator):  
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
IC = Industrialised Countries; DC: Developing countries 
LTI is the Long-term Impact, standard errors in brackets.  
The table only reports the LTI calculated on trade, imports and exports with/from/ to Industrialized Countries. 
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Table 4: Testing the differential impact of trade flows in MIC and LIC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EHII 0.849*** 0.818*** 0.873*** 0.871*** 0.847*** 0.810*** 
 (0.055) (0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.063) (0.076) 
TRADE_IC*MIC  0.0195** -0.0254     
 (0.010) (0.020)     
TRADE_IC*LIC 0.0101 0.0148     
 (0.020) (0.023)     
TRADE_DC*MIC -0.0208*** 0.0114     
 (0.0084) (0.015)     
TRADE_DC*LIC -0.0149 -0.0147     
 (0.019) (0.019)     
TRADE_IC*MIC (-1)  0.0577***     
  (0.019)     
TRADE_IC*LIC (-1)  -0.00368     
  (0.025)     
TRADE_DC*MIC (-1)  -0.0511***     
  (0.016)     
TRADE_DC*LIC (-1)  -0.00680     
  (0.020)     
IMP_IC*MIC   0.0102 -0.0262   
   (0.0095) (0.020)   
IMP_IC*LIC   -0.00333 -0.00252   
   (0.018) (0.016)   
IMP_DC*MIC   -0.00864 0.0193   
   (0.0077) (0.014)   
IMP_DC*LIC   -0.00646 -0.00523   
   (0.017) (0.017)   
IMP_IC*MIC (-1)    0.0535***   
    (0.018)   
IMP_IC*LIC (-1)    0.0107   
    (0.017)   
IMP_DC*MIC (-1)    -0.0415***   
    (0.013)   
IMP_DC*LIC (-1)    -0.00880   
    (0.017)   
EXP_IC*MIC     0.0116* 0.00960 
     (0.0080) (0.014) 
EXP_IC*LIC     0.00428 0.00733 
     (0.014) (0.025) 
EXP_DC*MIC     -0.0188*** -0.00853 
     (0.0073) (0.0088) 
EXP_DC*LIC     -0.00390 -0.00403 
     (0.014) (0.014) 
EXP_IC*MIC (-1)      0.00120 
      (0.015) 
EXP_IC*LIC (-1)      -0.00740 
      (0.028) 
EXP_DC*MIC (-1)      -0.0196** 
      (0.0092) 
EXP_DC*LIC (-1)      -0.00807 
      (0.016) 
GDP -0.0820 -0.108 -0.0544 -0.0488 -0.104 -0.132 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) 
GDP
2
 0.00389 0.00525 0.00225 0.00153 0.00581 0.00757 
 (0.0087) (0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0086) 
HK 0.000165 0.00427 -0.000817 0.00144 -0.0000146 0.00132 
 (0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0028) (0.0042) 
HK (-1) -0.000308 -0.00302 0.000205 -0.000751 -0.000499 -0.00173 
 (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
INFL 0.00642*** 0.00651** 0.00646*** 0.00693*** 0.00638*** 0.00696*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
LTI 
 0.178** 
(0.08) 
 0.212** 
(0.12) 
 0.056 
(0.05) 
Observations 783 735 783 735 782 734 
Number of countries 65 64 65 64 65 64 
% Continues        
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Notes:  Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (bias correction initialised by Arellano-Bond estimator):  * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
IC = Industrialised Countries; DC: Developing countries. MIC: Middle Income Countries; LIC: Low Income Countries 
LTI is the Long-term Impact, standard errors in brackets.  
The table only reports the LTI calculated on trade, imports and exports with/from/ to Industrialized Countries when interacted with the 
MIC dummy.  
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APPENDICES 
  
  
Table A1: List of countries and descriptive statistics 
 
Country Years Obs. 
Mean value 
of EHII 
Initial 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Change 
       
Algeria 1980, 1984-97 15 38.19 35.52 40.45 4.93 
Argentina 1984-90, 93-96 11 43.95 41.13 45.24 4.11 
Bangladesh 1980-92 13 44.61 40.45 48.44 7.99 
Bolivia 1980-99 20 48.92 43.73 50.49 6.76 
Brazil 1990, 92-95 5 47.02 45.22 47.49 2.27 
Bulgaria 1980-98 19 33.01 28.42 41.90 13.48 
Burundi 1980, 83, 86-91 8 50.04 47.65 52.62 4.97 
Cameroon 1980-84, 89-98 15 53.82 46.73 56.39 9.66 
Central African Republic 1980-83, 85-93 13 47.59 41.06 51.98 10.92 
Chile 1980-99 20 46.96 44.92 47.46 2.54 
China 1980-86 7 31.49 30.19 32.81 2.62 
Colombia 1980-99 20 44.29 42.27 44.78 2.51 
Congo, Rep. 1981-88 8 51.41 50.05 52.66 2.61 
Costa Rica 1984-98 15 41.29 46.94 39.91 -7.03 
Croatia 1986-96 11 33.64 30.81 37.10 6.29 
Cuba 1980-89 10 31.01 32.53 30.16 -2.37 
Cyprus 1980-99 20 39.34 40.59 40.15 -0.44 
Dominican Republic 1980-85 6 47.67 48.24 48.28 0.04 
Ecuador 1980-99 20 46.29 43.21 49.38 6.17 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980-99 20 43.99 39.46 47.04 7.58 
El Salvador 1980-85, 93-98 12 45.74 42.48 46.29 3.81 
Ethiopia 1990-98 9 44.09 40.87 44.88 4.01 
Fiji 1980-92, 96-98 16 45.06 43.23 42.75 -0.48 
Ghana 1980-87, 93-95 11 52.23 51.65 53.17 1.52 
Guatemala 1980-88, 91-95, 97-98 16 50.34 47.48 50.70 3.22 
Haiti 1980-88 9 46.03 46.09 45.20 -0.89 
Honduras 1981-95 15 46.14 41.82 47.28 5.46 
Hungary 1980-99 20 32.66 26.41 39.43 13.02 
India 1980-99 20 49.06 50.25 49.60 -0.65 
Indonesia 1980-98 19 47.80 50.26 44.49 -5.77 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980-93 14 37.89 40.06 43.15 3.09 
Jamaica 1980, 83-84, 86-92 10 53.04 53.66 55.26 1.60 
Jordan 1980-97 18 47.40 45.12 46.44 1.32 
Kenya 1980-98 19 48.40 48.37 47.94 -0.43 
Korea, Rep. 1980-99 20 37.39 38.83 37.75 -1.08 
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Country Years Obs. 
Mean value 
of EHII 
Initial 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Change 
       
Malawi 1980-98 19 51.13 46.40 54.97 8.57 
Malaysia 1980-99 20 40.14 39.08 38.10 -0.98 
Malta 1980-96 17 32.94 32.64 34.55 1.91 
Mauritius 1980-99 20 40.04 46.08 38.50 -7.58 
Mexico 1980-99 20 43.32 42.07 45.20 3.13 
Mozambique 1990-96 7 53.13 50.46 58.91 8.45 
Nepal 1986-91, 93-94, 96  9 47.45 46.21 44.26 -1.95 
Nicaragua 1980-85 6 42.12 42.93 41.61 -1.32 
Pakistan 1980-91, 96 13 47.41 46.20 49.43 3.23 
Panama 1980-94, 96-98 18 47.13 43.44 48.56 5.12 
Papua New Guinea 1980-89 10 51.20 49.69 52.06 2.37 
Peru 1982-92, 94 12 48.16 47.53 50.67 3.14 
Philippines 1980-97 18 47.01 43.05 48.04 4.99 
Poland 1980-99 20 32.55 28.95 42.50 13.55 
Romania 1990-94 5 28.98 24.77 32.12 7.35 
Senegal 1980-97 18 45.73 40.01 49.61 9.60 
Seychelles 1980-86 7 36.39 33.04 37.10 4.06 
Slovak Republic 1991-94, 97-98 6 33.57 29.50 36.25 6.75 
Slovenia 1987-98 12 28.98 23.27 32.88 9.61 
Sri Lanka 1980-95 16 45.47 46.79 44.47 -2.32 
Syrian Arab Republic 1980-98 19 43.45 46.31 40.59 -5.72 
Thailand 
1982, 84, 86, 88-91, 
93-94 
9 46.60 49.30 41.76 -7.54 
Togo 1980-84 5 51.69 52.09 47.22 -4.87 
Trinidad and Tobago 1981-95 15 50.38 47.40 53.15 5.75 
Tunisia 1980-81, 93-98 8 48.18 44.00 48.36 4.36 
Turkey 1980-98 19 45.07 44.48 46.99 2.51 
Uganda 1984-89 6 53.40 57.50 51.35 -6.15 
Uruguay 1980-98 19 42.51 40.17 46.70 6.53 
Venezuela, RB 1980-96  17 44.52 40.25 49.79 9.54 
Zambia 1980-82, 90, 94 5 48.95 48.42 49.42 1.00 
Zimbabwe 1980-98 19 45.37 44.44 47.44 3.00 
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TABLE A2: All Sample, different openness measures; dependent variable: EHII  
(supply of education proxied by the percentage of population with post-primary education over 
the percentage of population with no education = HKPP) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
EHII (-1) 0.891*** 0.904*** 0.892*** 0.904*** 0.906*** 0.909*** 
 (0.063) (0.071) (0.063) (0.071) (0.066) (0.081) 
GDP -0.0426 -0.0441 -0.0425 -0.0427 -0.0441 -0.0476 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
GDP
2
 0.00173 0.00219 0.00173 0.00206 0.00208 0.00265 
 (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0085) 
HKPP 0.00530 -0.00324 0.00568 -0.00264 0.00622 -0.000243 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033) 
HKPP (-1) -0.00554 0.000589 -0.00586 -0.000324 -0.00572 -0.00153 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) 
INFL 0.00633*** 0.00684** 0.00636*** 0.00689*** 0.00625** 0.00685*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
TRADE 0.00253 -0.00596     
 (0.0099) (0.016)     
TRADE (-1)  0.00585     
  (0.016)     
IMP   0.00124 -0.00396   
   (0.0079) (0.014)   
IMP (-1)    0.00518   
    (0.014)   
EXP     -0.00227 0.00163 
     (0.0084) (0.013) 
EXP (-1)      -0.00757 
      (0.015) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
LTI  
-0.001 
(0.11) 
 
0.013 
(0.09) 
 
-0.065 
(0.13) 
Observations 783 735 783 735 782 734 
Number of 
countries 
65 64 65 64 65 64 
 
 
Notes:  Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (bias correction initialised by Arellano-Bond estimator):   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
LTI is the Long-term Impact, standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
 
